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PROCESS & INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENTS LIMITED V. NIGERIA:
EXCEPTION UNDER THE FSIA WHEN AWARD HAS BEEN SET
ASIDE BY A COURT OF THE COUNTRY “UNDER THE LAW OF
WHICH” THE AWARD WAS MADE
In March 2018, Process & Industrial Developments Limited
(P&ID) filed a petition at the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia to confirm an arbitral award against the
Federal Republic of Nigeria. The proceedings were conducted in
three phases – jurisdictional, liability, and damages. The arbitration
provision in the underlying contract hardly represented a model of
clarity. It provided for the application of the Nigerian arbitration
act to any dispute between the parties. On the other hand, it specified
London as the “venue” of the proceedings. This posed a problem as
to whether Nigeria was the juridical seat of the arbitration, in which
case a Nigerian court would be the competent authority to set aside
any award rendered by the tribunal. The Nigerian Federal High
Court indeed vacated the liability award. At the confirmation stage
in the D.C. District Court, the question arose as to whether the
arbitration exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
is applicable in this case, consequently preventing Nigeria from
invoking its sovereign immunity against suits in the United States.
This note explores the parameters of the arbitration exception under
the FSIA. Specifically, this note suggests that the applicable law to
the arbitration was Nigerian law based on the language of the
provision. As a corollary, A Nigerian court had the competence to
set aside any award rendered in the proceedings. I adopt the view
that Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention, in addition to
applicable U.S. case law, imply that the Nigerian court’s decision
was valid. As such, there was no existing award upon which P&ID
could base its action to confirm the award. The arbitration exception
was not applicable in this case, as the existence of a valid award is a
pre-requisite for the application of the exception under the FSIA.
Ndifreke Uwem
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most parties coming to the United States to enforce
foreign arbitral awards proceed under the Federal Arbitration
Act (“FAA”). 1 The FAA gives U.S. federal courts the power to
enforce agreements to arbitrate by compelling arbitration,
staying litigation in the federal courts, and confirming and
enforcing arbitral awards. Chapter 2 of the FAA gives
domestic effect to the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(the “New York Convention”), thus making the enforcement
of foreign arbitral awards under the Convention a matter of
federal rather than state law. According to section 203 of the
FAA, U.S. federal district courts have original jurisdiction
over actions to enforce foreign arbitral awards.
The issuance of an arbitral award is thus not the end of
the road to redress. The process of obtaining recognition and
attaching assets in aid of execution of an arbitral award in the
United States can be a complex process involving multiple
sets of statutes and procedural rules. When it involves a
foreign state, additional challenges arise. Where there is no
voluntary compliance with the award, the winning party will
have to decide whether to commence recognition and
enforcement proceedings and seek attachment of assets to
obtain satisfaction of the award.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) grants
foreign states immunity from legal actions in the United
States unless one of the several exceptions described in
sections 1605 to 1607 of the Act applies. 2 Thus, a foreign state

1
2

9 U.S.C.§§ 1-16, 201-208,301-307 (2018).
28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1607; Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993)
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may become subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts if it
waives its claim of immunity, either explicitly or implicitly,3
engaged in commercial activity, 4 expropriated property in
violation of international law, 5 gained rights to property
situated in the United States, 6 engaged in certain types of
tortious activity giving rise to personal injury or death in the
United States, 7 or brought an action to enforce an arbitration
agreement or confirm an award pursuant to the agreement
where the arbitration takes place in the U.S., or the award is
governed by a treaty to which the U.S. is a signatory. 8 This
last exception is often referred to as the arbitration exception.
The claimant in Process and Industrial Developments Limited v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria 9 filed a petition in the D.C. district
court for confirmation of an award rendered in an arbitration
proceeding against the respondent, Nigeria. Process and
Industrial Development Limited (“P&ID”) invoked, among
other things, the arbitration exception in order to circumvent
Nigeria’s sovereign immunity against suits in U.S. courts.
P&ID submitted before the D.C. district court that, on the
basis of this exception, Nigeria has no sovereign immunity
defense to confirmation of the award. Nigeria on the other

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2000).
Id. § 1605(a)(2)
5 Id. § 1605(a)(3)
6 Id. § 1605(a)(4)
7 Id. § 1605(a)(5)
8 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) (this exception was added in 1988 to address
actions for enforcement or confirmation of arbitral awards to which a
foreign state is a party).
9 No. 18-cv-00594-CRC (D.D.C. filed Mar.16, 2018).
3
4
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hand argued against the application of the arbitration
exception asserted by P&ID. 10
This Note argues that in this case, Nigeria is entitled to
sovereign immunity under the FSIA because, based on the
current position of the law, the arbitration exception does not
apply here. Part II discusses the jurisdictional requirements
for confirmation of an arbitral award against a sovereign state
in the United States, including questions pertaining to
subject-matter jurisdiction, due process concerns under the
FSIA as well as personal jurisdiction under the arbitration
exception of the FSIA. Part III recounts the relevant facts in
P&ID v. Nigeria, from the pre-arbitration dispute, through the
arbitral proceedings resulting in a liability award, to the
judicial proceedings for annulment of the award and the
further arbitral proceedings to determine the amount of
damages. Part IV discusses Nigeria’s sovereign immunity visà-vis the jurisdiction of the D.C. district court to confirm the
award. This Note concludes that P&ID failed to satisfy the
legal requirements for application of the arbitration exception
to sovereign immunity. Thus, the D.C. district court lacks
jurisdiction under the FSIA to confirm the award because the
arbitration exception does not apply in this case.
II.

JURISDICTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS
FOR
CONFIRMATION OF AN ARBITRAL AWARD
AGAINST A SOVEREIGN STATE IN U.S.
COURTS.

At the time of this Note, the D.C. district court was yet to rule on the
confirmation of the award.
10
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The recognition and enforcement of international
arbitral awards in the United States is based primarily on the
New York Convention. 11 Chapter 2 of the FAA implements
the New York Convention in the United States. Section 207
thereof mandates that the court shall confirm the award
“unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of
recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the said
Convention.” However, in order for U.S. courts to exercise
jurisdiction over a claim, there must be both subject-matter
jurisdiction as well as personal jurisdiction.
A. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION UNDER THE FSIA
Foreign states historically enjoyed absolute immunity
in U.S. courts. However, the situation changed in 1952, when
the State Department issued a so-called Tate Letter,
announcing that it would be adhering to the policy of
“restrictive sovereign immunity,” 12 which extends immunity
to claims involving foreign states’ public acts and does not
extend to suits based on its private commercial conduct. The
principles of restrictive immunity were codified in 1976 when

There is also the 1975 Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration (the Panama Convention) codified in Chapter 3
of the FAA. The Panama Convention typically applies where a majority of
the parties to an arbitration agreement are from signatory countries to the
Panama Convention and are members of the Organization of American
States (OAS). Thus, because Nigeria is neither a signatory to the Panama
convention nor a member of the OAS, our primary focus in this Note will
be on the New York Convention.
12 The Tate Letter, from Jack B. Tate, the Acting Legal Advisor of the
United States Department of State, to Philip B. Perlman, the Acting United
States Attorney General, reprinted in 6 Digest of International Law.
11
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U.S. Congress passed the FSIA. The FSIA was amended in
1988 to include the arbitration exception. 13 The relevant
section of the FSIA provides that:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the
jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in
any case –
(6) in which the action is brought, either to
enforce an agreement made by the foreign
state with or for the benefit of a private party
to submit to arbitration all or any differences
which have arisen or which may arise
between the parties with respect to a defined
legal relationship, whether contractual or
not, concerning a subject matter capable of
settlement by arbitration under the laws of
the United States, or to confirm an award
made pursuant to such an agreement to
arbitrate, if …(B) the agreement or award is
or may be governed by a treaty or other
international agreement in force for the
United States calling for the recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards… 14
This means that a foreign state with an arbitral award
rendered against it is not immune to U.S. enforcement

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6), supra note 8. Prior to 1988, a claimant could
conceivably and did enforce arbitral awards under the waiver exception
but the 1988 amendments eliminated any doubts as to the applicability of
the waiver exception to the enforcement of arbitral awards.
14 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(1) and 1605(a)(6).
13
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jurisdiction if that award is governed by the New York
Convention.
Further, Section 1330(a) of Title 28, provides that:
The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction without regard to amount in
controversy of any nonjury civil action against a
foreign state…, as to any claim for relief in
personam with respect to which the foreign
state is not entitled to immunity either under
…this title or under any applicable international
agreement.
Taken together, Sections 1605(a)(6) and 1330(a) provide
subject-matter jurisdiction under the FSIA when a party
brings an action in a U.S. court to enforce an arbitral award
against a foreign state. The Supreme Court has held that the
FSIA provides “the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a
foreign state” in U.S. courts. 15 But the jurisdictional analysis
does not stop there. In addition to subject-matter jurisdiction,
the court must also have personal jurisdiction over the
sovereign state.
B. DUE PROCESS ISSUES UNDER THE FSIA
Unlike subject-matter jurisdiction under the FSIA
which is relatively straight-forward, personal jurisdiction
presents a little bit of a concern vis-à-vis the due process
requirement of the constitution. In the years since the FSIA
was enacted, courts have struggled to identify whether and to

15

Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping, 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989).
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what extent the constitutional aspects of personal jurisdiction
apply to foreign states. This debate has its roots in Title 28 of
the United States Code, section 1330(b), which states that
“[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to
every claim for relief over which the district courts have
jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made
under section 1608 of this title.” 16 Section 1330(a), quoted
above, when read together with 1330(b), suggest that “the
[FSIA] makes the statutory aspect of personal jurisdiction
simple: subject-matter jurisdiction plus service of process
equals personal jurisdiction.” 17
This state of affairs gave rise to some confusion, with
courts struggling to coordinate the language of section 1330
with common law constitutional principles concerning
personal jurisdiction. For example, some courts have relied on
section 1330(b) to hold that a party may not assert a lack of
personal jurisdiction if one of the exceptions to immunity
exists and service of process is proper. 18 Consequently, under
these reasoning, there is no need to demonstrate the same sort
of “minimum contacts” that are normally required to
establish personal jurisdiction as a matter of U.S.
constitutional law. 19

28 U.S.C. § 1330(b).
Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300,
308 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
18 See, e.g., Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 994 F. Supp. 1929, 1312 (D.
Colo. 1998); M.B.L. Int’l Contractors v. Trinidad and Tobago, 725 F. Supp.
52, 56 (D.D.C. 1989); Marlowe v. Argentine Naval Comm’n, 604 F. Supp.
703, 710 (D.D.C. 1985), aff’d on other grounds, 808 F.2d 120 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
19 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (describing the
constitutional “minimum contacts” analysis); see generally GARY B. BORN
16
17
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Regarding the FAA, U.S. courts have in the past reviewed the
rights of private individuals in actions to enforce arbitral
awards and have considered the question of personal
jurisdiction therein. 20 These cases make clear that subjectmatter jurisdiction arises out of the provisions of Article III of
the U.S. Constitution which divide power among the
branches of government. Personal jurisdiction arises out of a
completely separate area, namely the Due Process Clause.
The two issues cannot be collapsed into a single analysis.
The Second Circuit recognized this in Texas Trading &
Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 21 an early FSIA case.
There, the court stated that “the [FSIA] cannot create personal
jurisdiction where the Constitution forbids it.” 22 Many U.S.
courts have followed Texas Trading and undertaken separate
constitutional analyses after evaluating the statutory
elements of personal jurisdiction under the FSIA. 23 Although

& DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS:
COMMENTARY & MATERIALS 31-33 (1992) (describing the evolution of
personal jurisdiction requirements from Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
(1878) to Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
20 See Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284
F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002); Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC
“Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory,” 283 F.3d 208, 212 (4th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 101 (2002); Transatlantic Bulk Shipping v. Saudi
Chartering, 622 F. Supp 25, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
21 Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300
(2d Cir. 1981) (involving the commercial activity exception under the
FSIA), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
22 Id. at 308.
23 See, e.g., S & Davis Int’l Inc. v. Republic of Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292, 130304 (11th Cir. 2000); T.H. Davies & Co. v. Republic of Marshall Islands, 174
F.2d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 1998); Foremost-McKesson Inc. v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 759 F. Supp. 855, 860-61 (D.D.C. 1991); Libyan Am. Oil Co. v.
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courts in other circuits, including the Eleventh and Ninth
Circuits as well as the D.C. district court, followed Texas
Trading, others began to question it on grounds that foreign
states may not be “persons” within the meaning of the U.S.
Constitution and therefore may not be entitled to the same
“minimum contacts” analysis that private parties are entitled
to claim. 24 This rationale came from the Supreme Court
decision in Argentina v. Weltover, although ironically the
decision assumed, without specifically holding, that a foreign
state was a “person” under the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 25 However, the Court’s opinion reflected a
reluctance to extend due process protections to foreign states,
should the question ever arise in the future. In so doing, the
Court relied heavily on a previous decision holding that
individual U.S. states are not “persons” under the Due
Process Clause. 26
In 1981, when the Second Circuit held in Texas Trading
that a foreign state was a “person” within the meaning of the
U.S. Constitution, it engaged in only a cursory analysis of the
subject. 27 Because Texas Trading is not binding outside of the
Second Circuit, the D.C. Circuit was able to do its own
analysis of the constitutional status of foreign states in the

Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 482 F. Supp. 1175, 1177 (D.D.C.
1980), vacated without opinion, 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
24 See, e.g., S & Davis Int’l Inc., 218 F.3d at 1303; Creighton Ltd. v. Gov’t of
the State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118, 124-25 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
25 Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992).
26 Id. (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966)).
27 Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300,
313 (2d Cir. 1981) (involving the commercial activity exception under the
FSIA), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
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2002 case of Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 28
There, the D.C. Circuit concluded that foreign states are not
“persons” as a matter of U.S. constitutional law and are
therefore exempt from due process protections of personal
jurisdiction. 29 According to Price, courts faced with actions
under the FSIA need not consider the amount and type of
contacts between a foreign state and the United States, but
instead need only adopt the statutory “subject-matter
jurisdiction plus service of process” test described above. 30
It was unclear whether Price, which arose under section
1605(a)(7) (the terrorism exception) would apply to
enforcement actions under section 1605(a)(6) (the arbitration
exception) of the FSIA. However, in 2005, the D.C. Circuit
demonstrated its willingness to extend the principles of Price
to actions to enforce foreign arbitral awards in TMR Energy
Ltd. v. State Property Fund of Ukraine. 31
C. PERSONAL
JURISDICTION
ARBITRATION EXCEPTION

UNDER

THE

i. Earlier Case Law
Majority of available case law discuss the issue of
personal jurisdiction under the arbitration exception in
combination with the implied waiver exception under section

Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir.
2002).
29 Id. at 99.
30 Id.; Supra note 17.
31 TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Property Fund of Ukraine, 411 F.3d 296, (D.C.
Cir. 2005).
28
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1605(a)(1). 32 The two arguments are very closely linked such
that it is sometimes unclear whether the courts will allow a
party to argue jurisdiction based only on the arbitration
exception. For instance, the plaintiff in TMR Energy explicitly
denied its reliance on the implied waiver exception in the trial
court, choosing instead to focus on the arbitration exception.33
Nevertheless, the D.C. District Court raised the implied
waiver issue sua sponte, eventually basing its decision on those
grounds despite the defendant’s claim that a court may not
consider jurisdictional grounds explicitly avoided by the
plaintiff. 34
Questions often arise as to the existence of personal
jurisdiction under the arbitration exception where there is a
distinction between a sovereign state itself and an agency of
the sovereign state. Two cases have held that subject-matter
existed but both are questionable on personal jurisdiction
grounds. For instance, S & Davis International v. Republic of
Yemen involved an arbitral award against a Yemeni
corporation that was held to be an agency or instrumentality

See TMR Energy Ltd., 411 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2005); S & Davis Int’l Inc. v.
Republic of Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2000); Creighton Ltd. v. Gov’t
of the State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Cargill Int’l S.A. v. M/T
Pavel Dybenko, 991 F.2d 1012 (2d Cir. 1993); Seetransport Wiking Trader
Schiffarhtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. v. Navimpex Centrala Navala, 989 F.2d
572 (2d Cir. 1993); Maritime Ventures Int’l, Inc. v. Caribbean Trading and
Fidelity, Ltd., 732 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); M.B.L. Int’l Contractors
v. Trinidad and Tobago, 725 F. Supp. 52 (D.D.C. 1989) (involving an
arbitral award, but argued under the implied waiver exception rather than
the arbitration exception).
33 Brief of Appellant State Property Fund of Ukraine, p.25.
34 Id. at 25, 30 (citing World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan,
296 F.3d 1154, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1187 (2003)).
32
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of the state of Yemen. 35 There was some question as to
whether the exception could apply against Yemen itself, since
it was not a signatory to the arbitration agreement resulting
in the award, but the Eleventh Circuit held that the defendant
corporation was under the control of the state and therefore
section 1605(a)(6) applied. 36 The Eleventh Circuit addressed
the question of personal jurisdiction separately from that of
subject-matter jurisdiction but did not discuss its reasons for
undertaking a constitutional due process analysis. Instead,
the court avoided the issue of whether a foreign state is a
“person” under the U.S. Constitution, preferring to hold that,
in any event, the constitutional elements of personal
jurisdiction were met in these circumstances. 37
Although the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion is
evenhanded in many respects, it provides an avenue for those
who believe that a state’s agreement to arbitrate a dispute
opens that state up to enforcement proceedings in virtually
any country 38 by indicating that it is “only ‘fair and just’ [for
a plaintiff] to seek enforcement of the outcome of a good faith
agreement to arbitrate.” 39 The court also held that this sort of
enforcement action “comports with the minimum contacts
determination that the defendant ‘should reasonably

S & Davis Int’l, 218 F.3d at 1292.
Id. at 1302.
37 Id. at 1303.
38 Karen Halverson, Is a Foreign State a “Person”? Does it Matter?: Personal
Jurisdiction, Due Process, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 34 N.Y.U.
J. INT’L L. & POL. 115, 179-84 (2001).
39 S & Davis Int’l, 218 F.3d at 1304-05 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
35
36
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anticipate being haled into court’ in the forum’s
jurisdiction.” 40
Creighton Ltd. v. Government of the State of Qatar also
involved the successful application of the arbitration
exception to the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction, although
the primary question here was whether the arbitration
exception could be applied retroactively, which was
answered in the affirmative. 41 However, the D.C. Circuit
separated its discussion of subject-matter jurisdiction from its
discussion of personal jurisdiction, stating that “although
subsection (a)(6) confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the
court, it does not follow that Qatar waived its objection to
personal jurisdiction.” 42 Indeed, the D.C. Circuit claimed that
“the decisions of which we are aware have held that an
implicit waiver of personal jurisdiction in a defendant’s
agreement to litigate or to arbitrate in a particular jurisdiction
is applicable only within that jurisdiction.” 43 Thus, “[i]t seems
…implausible that Qatar, by agreeing to arbitrate in France, a
signatory to a treaty containing a similar reciprocal
‘recognition and enforcement’ clause, should be deemed
thereby to have waived its right to challenge personal
jurisdiction in the United States.” 44 This, of course, takes the
opposite view of S & Davis by suggesting that courts that rely
on the arbitration exception must do more than simply
establish the existence of an arbitral award before concluding

Id.
Creighton Ltd. v. Government of the State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118 (D.C.
Cir. 1999). The retroactivity of the FSIA was confirmed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
42 Id. at 126.
43 Id. (citations omitted).
44 Id. at 127.
40
41
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that personal jurisdiction exists. 45 Although the D.C. Circuit
was influenced by the fact that Qatar was not a signatory to
the New York Convention, the case provides a useful analysis
of section 1605(a)(6)’s ability to confer personal jurisdiction,
as opposed to its ability to confer subject-matter jurisdiction.
ii. TMR Energy
TMR Energy assumes additional importance
considering the lack of case law regarding personal
jurisdiction and enforcement of arbitral awards under the
FSIA. TMR Energy followed the holding in Price – that foreign
states are not entitled to due process protections under the
U.S. Constitution. Thus, based on this principle from Price, the
outcome in TMR Energy was somewhat certain. As the D.C.
Circuit stated, “[the State Property Fund of Ukraine] – like its
principal, the State of Ukraine – is not a ‘person’ for purposes
of the due process clause and cannot invoke the minimum
contacts test to avoid the personal jurisdiction of the district
court.” 46 Both TMR Energy and Price relied heavily on the fact
that individual U.S. states are not considered “persons” under
the Due Process Clause and that it therefore “would be highly
incongruous to afford greater Fifth Amendment rights to
foreign nations, who are entirely alien to our constitutional
system, than are afforded to the states, who help make up the
fabric of that system.” 47

Id.
TMR Energy, Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of Ukraine, 411 F.3d 296, 302 (D.C.
Cir. 2005).
47 Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24
(1966)). See also TMR Energy, Ltd., 411 F.3d at 300.
45
46
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
OF P&ID v. NIGERIA
A. THE UNDERLYING DISPUTE GIVING RISE
ARBITRATION

TO THE

The dispute arose out of a Gas Supply and Processing
Agreement (the “GSPA”) dated January 11, 2010 between
P&ID and the Ministry of Petroleum Resources of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria (“Nigeria”). 48 Under the GSPA, P&ID
was to obtain “Wet Gas” for free from Nigeria and convert it
into “Lean Gas,” which Nigeria could use to power electric
plants. 49 According to a witness statement submitted by
P&ID, P&ID would not charge Nigeria for converting the Wet
Gas. Rather, in exchange for the Wet Gas, P&ID would have
the right to keep certain by-products – Natural Gas Liquids
(“NGLs”) – and sell them on the open market. 50
Beginning in mid-2006, P&ID began exploring the
feasibility of the project and commissioned various studies
and engineering plans. 51 This culminated in the execution of
the GSPA in 2010. Under the GSPA, P&ID was obligated to
build a gas processing facility and Nigeria was to supply the
facility with Wet Gas from two oil mining leases operated by
Addax Petroleum and Exxon Mobil. 52

Process and Industrial Dev. Ltd. v. The Ministry of Petroleum Resources
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Final Award, (Jan. 31, 2017) ¶ 2.
49 Id.
50 First Witness Statement of Michael Quinn, Feb. 10, 2014. ¶ 65.
51 Id. at ¶¶ 47-48.
52 GSPA §§ 3(a), 3(c).
48
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In March 2011, Addax informed P&ID that it was
unwilling to supply the amount of Wet Gas envisioned by the
GSPA. 53 P&ID attempted to negotiate a compromise, which
Addax initially supported but ultimately rejected in June of
2012. 54 At this point, the project fell apart.
B. THE ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS RESULTING
LIABILITY AWARD

IN A

On August 22, 2012, P&ID commenced arbitration
against Nigeria. P&ID filed for arbitration pursuant to section
20 of the GSPA, which contains a choice of law clause and an
arbitration clause. The relevant part of the arbitration
agreement states as follows:
“The Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in
accordance with the laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.”
The Parties agree that if any difference or dispute
arises between them concerning the interpretation or
performance of this Agreement and if they fail to settle such
difference or dispute amicably, then a Party may serve on the
other a notice of arbitration under the rules of the Nigerian
Arbitration and Conciliation Act (Cap A18 LFN 2004) which,
except as otherwise provided herein, shall apply to any dispute
between such Parties under this Agreement.
“The venue of the arbitration shall be London, England or
otherwise as agreed by the Parties. The arbitration

Process and Industrial Dev. Ltd. v. The Ministry of Petroleum Resources
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Part Final Award, (Jul. 17, 2015) ¶ 38(a).
54 Id. at ¶¶ 38(c)-(d).
53
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proceedings and record shall be in the English language”. 55
(emphasis added).
Pursuant to that agreement, P&ID served notice of the
arbitration on Nigeria. The tribunal was then constituted with
three arbitrators, two of whom were English and one
Nigerian. 56 The tribunal issued several procedural orders
with the heading as “In the Matter of an Arbitration Under
the Rules of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of Nigeria”
and issued other directions for parties to comply with
provisions of the Nigerian Arbitration Act. 57
On October 11, 2013, P&ID wrote to Nigeria to “invite
you agree” that certain preliminary objections raised by
Nigeria be decided “pursuant to Section 31(4) of the
Arbitration Act 1996,” the law governing arbitrations in
England. 58 In a letter dated October 14, 2013, Nigeria declined
that invitation and responded that it would proceed “as
contemplated by the parties under the Nigerian Arbitration
and Conciliation Act.” 59 In a response letter dated October 24,
2013, P&ID acknowledged that the parties had agreed to
arbitrate under the Rules of the Nigerian Arbitration Act, but
asserted for the first time that it had referenced England’s
“Arbitration Act of 1996” because it believed “the juridical
seat of this arbitration is London.” 60

GSPA § 20.
Process & Industrial Dev. Ltd. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria & Ministry of
Petroleum Resources of the Fed. Republic of Nigeria, Petition to Confirm
Arbitration Award ¶ 18, No. 18-594, WL 3359784 (D.D.C. 2018).
57 Witness Declaration of Seamus Ronald Andrew in Support of Petition
to Confirm Arbitration Award, Mar. 16, 2018, Exhibit 11 at 35-63.
58 Id. at 44.
59 Id. at 46.
60 Id. at 47.
55
56
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In subsequent procedural orders, the Tribunal began
to style the proceedings with reference to both the Nigerian
and English arbitration laws: “In the Matter of the Arbitration
Act 1996 (England and Wales) and In the Matter of an
Arbitration Under the Rules of the Nigerian Arbitration and
Conciliation Act 1988.” 61 The Tribunal further divided the
proceedings into three parts relating to jurisdiction, liability,
and damages. On July 3, 2014, the tribunal issued a decision
on jurisdiction. Although the agreement seemed to only
reference London, England as a “venue,” the Tribunal applied
the English Arbitration Act to conclude that it had
jurisdiction. 62 Thus, the arbitration proceeded to the liability
phase, and on July 17, 2015, the Tribunal issued an award on
liability. The Tribunal held that the GSPA was valid and
authorized, and that Nigeria was liable for breaching it. 63
C. THE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS TO SET ASIDE THE
LIABILITY AWARD AND THE FURTHER ARBITRATION
RESULTING IN A DAMAGES AWARD
Upon finding Nigeria liable, and before the Tribunal rendered
its decision on damages, Nigeria sought judicial assistance to
have the arbitration enjoined and the liability award set aside.
Nigeria contended that given the parties’ express agreement
to arbitrate under the rules of the Nigerian Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, a Nigerian court was the competent
authority to supervise the arbitration and annul any award

Id. at 107.
Id. Exhibit 7 at 36.
63 Id. Exhibit 8 at 54, 80.
61
62
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made pursuant to the agreement. However, Nigeria also
applied for annulment in England.
The Commercial Court in London denied Nigeria’s
application as untimely. 64 Nigeria then applied to set aside
the award before the Federal High Court in Lagos, Nigeria,
arguing that the parties had agreed to arbitrate under the
Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act and therefore had
“effectively agreed that the seat of the arbitration is
Nigeria.” 65 Nigeria further argued that London was “only the
venue for hearings in the arbitration; a geographically
convenient place.” 66 Nigeria also moved to enjoin parties
from continuing the arbitral proceedings pending resolution
of the set aside motion. On April 20, 2016, the Nigerian court
granted the injunction. 67
P&ID did not participate in the Nigerian court
proceedings. 68 Instead, it asked the Tribunal to determine the
seat of the arbitration.69 Nigeria opposed the request, arguing
that the determination of the seat was not in controversy.70
Nigeria asserted that the seat of the arbitration was Nigeria
because the GSPA was governed by Nigerian law and
because the parties had expressly agreed to arbitrate under
the rules of the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act. 71
On April 26, 2016, the Tribunal concluded that by designating
London as the “venue,” the parties had selected London as

Id. Exhibit 11 at 154, 162.
Id. at 2-4.
66 Id.
67 Id. Exhibit 16 at 44-48.
68 Id. at 38.
69 Id. Exhibit 12.
70 Id. Exhibit 16 at 36.
71 Id. Exhibit 12 at 6.
64
65
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the only seat of the arbitration, notwithstanding their express
agreement to arbitrate under the Nigerian Arbitration Act.72
Shortly thereafter, on May 24, 2016, the Nigerian court issued
an order setting aside the liability award. 73
Despite the Nigerian judgment setting aside the
liability award, the Tribunal proceeded to the damages phase.
Nigeria participated in the further proceedings but
maintained the position that the liability award had been set
aside in Nigeria. 74 On January 31, 2017, the Tribunal issued
the damages award. 75 On March 16, 2018, P&ID filed a
Petition at the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
seeking to confirm the award and alleging that approximately
$9 billion is due on the award.
IV.

NIGERIA’S SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE
JURISDICTION OF THE D.C. DISTRICT COURT.

Nigeria is a foreign state as defined in the FSIA. 76 And
the FSIA is the “sole basis” for establishing jurisdiction over a
foreign state with respect to any claim for which it is not
entitled to sovereign immunity. 77 A foreign state is entitled to

Id. ¶¶ 1-40.
Id. Exhibit 13.
74 Id. Exhibits 14 and 15; see also Process & Industrial Dev. Ltd. v. Fed.
Republic of Nigeria & Ministry of Petroleum Resources of the Fed.
Republic of Nigeria, Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award ¶ 26, No. 18594, WL 3359784 (D.D.C. 2018).
75 Id. Exhibit 17.
76 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
77 Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, 795 F.3d 200, 203 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S.
428, 439 (1989), and citing Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461
U.S. 480, 488-89 (1983)).
72
73
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“virtually absolute immunity” from suit unless the
“substantive requirements” of any one of the exceptions to
immunity are satisfied. 78 Thus, “[i]f no exception applies, a
foreign sovereign’s immunity under the FSIA is complete,”
and the district court lacks jurisdiction over the case. 79
Further, a court is obligated to make the sovereign immunity
determination at the outset, and a foreign state is not required
to assert its substantive defenses against confirmation of an
award until that “threshold determination of FSIA immunity”
has been conclusively and authoritatively resolved.80
A. APPLICABILITY OF THE ARBITRATION EXCEPTION.
In Chevron v. Ecuador, the D.C. Circuit established a
three-part test that a petitioner must satisfy for the arbitration
exception to apply. 81 The first step is determining that the
award is or may be “governed by a treaty signed by the
United States calling for the recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards.” 82 The New York Convention is such a treaty.
A district court must then make two additional findings: (1)

Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486, 489; accord Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 1312 (2017).
79 Phoenix Consulting Inc. v. Republic of Angola, 216 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
80 Blue Ridge Invs., L.L.C. v. Republic of Argentina, 735 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir.
2013); Segni v. Commercial Office of Spain, 816 F.2d 344, 347 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Posner, J.) (“A foreign government should not be put to the expense of
defending what may be a protracted lawsuit without an opportunity to
obtain an authoritative determination of its amendability to suit at the
earliest possible opportunity.”). See also Helmerich & Payne, 137 S. Ct. at
1317, 1319, 1324.
81 795 F.3d at 204.
82 Id.
78
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the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, and (2) the
existence of an enforceable award. 83 A “non-frivolous claim
involving an arbitration award” is not enough to sustain
jurisdiction; the Court must determine that each of these
requirements has actually been met. 84 Although these
jurisdictional questions may overlap with a foreign state’s
defenses under the New York Convention, 85 a court must still
answer them before it takes jurisdiction. 86 Because the lability
award was set aside by a Nigerian court, P&ID could not
claim to have an existing award and therefore could not
satisfy all the requirements to abrogate Nigeria’s immunity
under the arbitration exception.
In Chevron, the D.C. Circuit considered whether a valid
arbitration agreement existed for purposes of satisfying the
arbitration exception, even though that argument was
“largely coextensive” with Ecuador’s defenses “against
confirmation of the award under the New York
Convention.”87 The district court asserted jurisdiction merely
because the proceedings involved confirmation of an arbitral
award under the New York Convention, but “eschewed” the
question of whether a valid arbitration agreement existed for
purposes of satisfying the arbitration exception to
immunity. 88 The court of appeals held that “this was error,”

Id.
Id.
85 Id. at 207.
86 Id. at 205.
87 795 F.3d at 207. See also New York Convention, art. V(1)(a) (providing
that a court may refuse to enforce an award if the respondent proves that
the arbitration agreement “is not valid”).
88 795 F.3d at 205 n.3 (reasoning that Ecuador could not have “two bites at
the apple of the merits of its dispute,” i.e., one under the FSIA and another
83
84
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and that the district court had to decide whether the parties
had in fact agreed to arbitrate “as part of its jurisdictional
analysis.” 89 Likewise, the “existence of an award” is an issue
that the Court “must resolve in order to maintain
jurisdiction.” 90 Thus, if there is “no award to enforce,” then
the Court “lacks jurisdiction over the foreign state and the
action must be dismissed.” 91
In P&ID v. Nigeria, jurisdiction is unavailable under the
arbitration exception because there is no award to enforce.
The question of whether an award exists, like the question of
whether a valid arbitration agreement exists, is “largely
coextensive” with one of the grounds for resisting
enforcement under the New York Convention. 92 Under
Article V(1)(e), an award “does not exist to be enforced” if it
has been “lawfully ‘set aside’ by a competent authority” at the
seat of the arbitration, i.e., the primary jurisdiction for
annulling the award. 93 Article V(1)(e) states, in relevant part:
Recognition and enforcement of the award may be
refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked,
only if that party furnishes . . . proof that . . . [t]he award . . .

under the New York Convention, Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador,
949 F. Supp. 2d 57, 63 (D.D.C. 2013)).
89 795 F.3d at 205 n.3.
90 Id. at 204.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 207.
93 TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(refusing to enforce an award that had been set aside in Colombia) (citing
Baker Marine (Nigeria) v. Chevron (Nigeria), 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999)
(denying confirmation of an award that had been set aside in Nigeria)).
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has been set aside . . . by a competent authority of the country
in which, or under the law of which, that award was made. 94
The New York Convention “provides two tests for
determining which country has primary jurisdiction over an
arbitration award: a country in which an award is made, and
a country under the law of which an award is made.” 95
iii. Nigeria is the Country “under the Law of
which” the Award Was Made
The phrase “under the law of which” points to “the
procedural law governing the arbitration.” 96 In Belize Social
Development, the D.C. Circuit found that a court in London
was a competent authority to set aside the award where the
parties’ agreement stated that any disputes would be
“resolved by arbitration under the London Court of
International Arbitration (LCIA) Rules.” 97 Similarly, in Baker
Marine, a Nigerian court was considered to be the competent
authority to set aside the award under the parties’ arbitration
agreement, which provided that any dispute would be
“settled by arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration

New York Convention, art. V(1)(e).
Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas
Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 308 (5th Cir. 2004).
96 Belize Soc. Dev., Ltd. v. Government of Belize, 668 F.3d 724, 731 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (noting that the phrase “under the law of which” refers to the
“procedural law under which the arbitration was conducted”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 5-12 (Am.
Law. Inst. 2010) (“RESTATEMENT”). See also RESTATEMENT § 5-12(d) (“For
purposes of this Section [Article V(1)(e) of the NY Convention], a
Convention award is deemed to be made under the law of the country
whose arbitration law governed the arbitral proceedings.”).
97 668 F.3d at 728.
94
95
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Rules of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL)” and “specified that the arbitration
‘procedure (insofar as not governed by said UNCITRAL rules
. . .) shall be governed by the substantive laws of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria.’” 98
Here, P&ID and Nigeria expressly agreed on Nigerian
law as the procedural law that would govern the arbitration
by agreeing to arbitrate “under the rules of the Nigerian
Arbitration and Conciliation Act.” 99 Thus, under Article
V(1)(e) of the New York Convention, a Nigerian court is a
“competent authority” with “primary jurisdiction” to annul
any award made pursuant to that agreement. 100 That is what
the Nigerian court did here when it set aside the liability
award.
Further, because the liability award was “lawfully set
aside” by a Nigerian court, 101 there is no finding of liability on
which the damages award can rest. 102 This outcome cannot be

191 F.3d at 195 (ellipsis in original).
GSPA § 20. Cf. Dixilyn-Field Drilling, Ltd. v. Mobil Oil Corp., No. 83 CIV
9308 (LBS), 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17992, at *2, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1984)
(compelling arbitration “under Nigerian law” where the arbitration clause
stated that any disputes would be settled by arbitration “according to
Arbitration Act of Nigeria”).
100 TermoRio, 487 F.3d at 935.
101 Id.
102 Cf. John Morrell & Co. v. Local Union 304A of United Food &
Commercial Workers, 913 F.2d 544, 562 (8th Cir. 1990) (affirming
annulment of an arbitral award that was rendered in disregard of a
contrary liability determination in a prior judicial proceeding, and holding
that the liability ruling precluded the losing party from presenting further
evidence and “barred” the arbitrator “from reconsidering the issue”). See
also Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327 F.2d 944, 955
(2d Cir. 1964).
98
99
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avoided because the Tribunal and P&ID chose to ignore the
Nigerian court’s judgement, and its injunction, and to
proceed to the damages phase of the case. In short, the
Nigerian judgment left the arbitrators with nothing to decide
and the subsequent damages award would consequently be a
nullity.
iv. The D.C. Circuit is “obliged to Respect” the
Nigerian Court’s Judgment Setting Aside the
Liability Award.
The D.C. District Court, where the petition for
confirmation was filed, is “obliged to respect” the Nigerian
judgment. 103 There is no basis to “second-guess” that
judgment, 104 unless P&ID shows that it has been “tainted,” or
is anything “other than authentic,” 105 or unless enforcing that
judgment would offend “fundamental notions of what is
decent and just in the State where enforcement is sought.” 106
In TermoRio, the award had been set aside by a
competent court in Colombia, a primary jurisdiction under
the New York Convention. 107 Since there was no cause for
questioning the Colombian judgment, the D.C. Circuit ruled
that the award had been “lawfully set aside.” 108 The court of
appeals further noted that this was a “peculiarly Colombian
affair,” insofar as it concerned “a dispute involving
Colombian parties over a contract to perform services in

TermoRio, 487 F.3d at 930 (citing Baker Marine).
Id. at 937.
105 Id. at 935.
106 Id. at 938.
107 Id. at 935.
108 Id.
103
104
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Colombia which led to a Colombian arbitration decision and
Colombian litigation” in accordance with the parties’
agreement “to be bound by Colombian law.” 109 The D.C.
Circuit thus concluded that it was “in no position to
pronounce the decision of [the Colombian court] wrong.” 110
The Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in
Baker Marine. There, the court of appeals also affirmed the
district court’s decision refusing to enforce an award that had
been set aside by a Nigerian court, citing Article V(1)(e) and
“principles of comity.” 111 In rejecting the argument that the
judgment of the Nigerian court should be ignored, the Second
Circuit reasoned that it was “sufficient answer that the parties
contracted in Nigeria that their disputes would be arbitrated
under the laws of Nigeria.”112 It added that the “primary
purpose” of the FAA is “ensuring that private agreements to
arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.” 113 It further
explained that the petitioner had “made no contention that
the Nigerian courts acted contrary to Nigerian law.”114
Finally, it held that the Convention’s permissive language
under Article V – providing that a court “may” refuse
enforcement – did not afford the court any leeway to enforce
an award annulled in Nigeria, as the petitioner had “shown
no adequate reason for refusing to recognize the judgments
of the Nigerian court.” 115

Id. at 939.
Id.
111 191 F.3d at 196.
112 Id. at 197.
113 Id. (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).
114 Id.
115 Id.
109
110
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The same analysis applies here. P&ID acknowledged
that the Nigerian court granted Nigeria’s motion to set aside
the liability award. 116 Absent substantial evidence that the
Nigerian judgment was tainted by any irregularities that
would offend the United States’ “fundamental notions of
what is decent and just,” the D.C. District Court is bound to
respect, uphold and apply it. 117 Moreover, as in TermoRio and
Baker Marine, this case involves a particularly foreign affair:
the Nigerian state and a foreign company entered into a
contract in Nigeria to perform services in Nigeria, which led
to an arbitration award rendered under the arbitration law of
Nigeria and then a Nigerian judgment setting aside that
award in accordance with the parties’ agreement to be bound
by the laws of Nigeria. There are zero ties to the United States.
Like the D.C. Circuit in TermoRio, the D.C. district court in this
case should decline any invitation to find error in the
judgment of the Nigerian court.
v. The Choice of an Arbitral “Venue” Does Not
Affect the Nigerian Court’s Judgment.
The parties’ choice of a procedural law to govern the
arbitration proceedings is the determinative factor in
establishing the primary jurisdiction or seat for purposes of
the New York Convention. 118 The fact that the parties chose
London as the “venue” for the arbitration proceedings does

116 See Process & Industrial Dev. Ltd. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria &
Ministry of Petroleum Resources of the Fed. Republic of Nigeria, Petition
to Confirm Arbitration Award ¶ 26, No. 18-594, WL 3359784 (D.D.C. 2018).
117 TermoRio, 487 F.3d at 936, 938.
118 Karaha Bodas, 364 F.3d at 309-10.
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not affect the Nigerian court’s primacy as a competent
authority under Article V(1)(e). The selection of a geographic
location for the hearings creates a presumption as to the seat
of the arbitration only “in the absence of any express
statement making another country’s procedural law
applicable.” 119 Here, the parties expressly agreed that the
arbitration would be conducted “under the rules of the
Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act,” negating any
presumption that they agreed on English procedural law by
naming London as the “venue.” 120
Indeed, it is possible for parties to choose one country
to be the physical location for the arbitral proceedings, but
choose a different country as the “seat” of the arbitration “in
the legal sense.” 121 Had the parties intended to choose
London as the “legal” seat of the arbitration, they would have
used the term “seat” or “site,” rather than “venue” or any
other variation, to avoid ambiguity. 122 In short, the parties did
not agree on English procedural law by designating London

Id.
GSPA § 20.
121 Karaha Bodas, 364 F.3d at 292 (finding that the award was “made in”
Geneva in accordance with the parties’ presumptive agreement that Swiss
procedural law applied, notwithstanding the fact that the proceedings
“physically occurred in Paris”); RESTATEMENT § 5-12 cmt. b. (“[A]n award
will be deemed to have been made at the arbitral seat regardless of where
the hearings were actually held or the award was actually prepared or
signed.”).
122 Id. at 291 (finding that Switzerland was the “legal” seat where the
parties had agreed that “the site of the arbitration shall be Geneva”)
(emphasis added); 2 GARY B. BORN, INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1540
(2d ed. 2014) (“The term ‘seat’ is distinctly preferable to either ‘forum’ or
‘venue’; these latter terms imply that the designated location will be where
meetings or hearings must be conducted . . . .”).
119
120
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as the “venue.” Rather, they chose London as the location for
the arbitration hearings and meetings.
Even if the selection of London as the “venue” were
construed to be an agreement as to the legal seat of the
arbitration, that conclusion still does not divest the Nigerian
court of jurisdiction to annul the award under Article V(1)(e)
of the New York Convention. By its terms, the Convention
“suggests the potential for more than one country of primary
jurisdiction.” 123 For instance, in Karaha Bodas, the Fifth Circuit
found that a Swiss court was the only competent authority
under Article V(1)(e) because the parties had contractually
designated the “site of the arbitration as Switzerland,” and
had “not otherwise expressly identif[ied] the procedural law
that would apply to the arbitration.”124 However, the court
recognized that the parties could have agreed that “one
country [would] be the site of the arbitration but the
proceedings [would] be held under the arbitration law of
another country,” in which case the courts of both countries
could be competent to annul the award. 125 The court declined
to rule on this issue because “both of the New York
Convention criteria for the country with primary jurisdiction
point[ed] to Switzerland – and only to Switzerland.” 126
Similarly, in Belize Social Development, the D.C. Circuit
found that an English court was the only competent authority
to set aside the award because the arbitration occurred in
London and the parties expressly agreed to the arbitral laws

Karaha Bodas, 364 F.3d at 308.
Id. at 290.
125 Id. at 291, 308-09.
126 Id. at 309.
123
124
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of England. 127 In support of that conclusion, the D.C. Circuit
cited section 5-12 of the Restatement, which is very clear on
the effect of naming one country as the “seat” of the
arbitration while at the same time expressly agreeing on the
procedural law of another: “In that event, the award will be
subject to the primary jurisdiction of authorities in two
countries, both of whom will have competence to set it aside.” 128
Thus, even under this interpretation of the arbitration
agreement, the Nigerian court retained primary jurisdiction
to enjoin the proceedings and annul the liability award. Here,
application of Nigerian procedural law forecloses any ruling
that the United Kingdom and only the United Kingdom can
be the competent jurisdiction to set aside the award.
Nothing that happened in the underlying arbitration
or judicial proceedings detracts from this analysis. The
Tribunal’s decision suggesting that there could only be one
seat for the arbitration, is not binding on the D.C. district
court. 129 That question is one of interpretation of the New
York Convention, a treaty to which the United States is a
party. As the Fifth Circuit explained in Karaha Bodas, there are
two tests for identifying a primary jurisdiction under Article
V(1)(e) of the New York Convention, and a court in the
enforcing state may make its own determination for purposes
of refusing enforcement. 130 Moreover, the Tribunal’s decision,
purporting to apply English procedural law and recognizing
London as the only seat of the arbitration, is not entitled to
deference because it “manifestly disregarded the parties’

668 F.3d at 731.
RESTATEMENT § 5-12 cmt. b. (emphasis added).
129 Tribunal’s Procedural Order No. 12.
130 364 F.3d at 308.
127
128
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agreement [and] the law.” 131 Again, the parties expressly
agreed to conduct the arbitration “under the rules of the
Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act,” and the GSPA
makes no reference whatsoever to English law. 132
Nor does Nigeria’s decision to apply for annulment
both in England and Nigeria conflict with its rights under the
arbitration agreement or the New York Convention.
Considering that the parties expressly agreed on Nigerian
procedural law, the only relevant decision on annulment is
the Nigerian judgment. Nevertheless, even if London were
ultimately accepted as one of the seats of the arbitration, the
Nigerian court would nevertheless retain “primary
jurisdiction” as a competent authority in the country “under
the law of which, that award was made.” 133 Thus, Nigeria
always had a right to seek annulment in the Nigerian courts,
and that right did not dissipate when it filed to set aside the
liability award in England.
In sum, because the liability award on which the
damages award is premised was lawfully set aside by a court
in Nigeria, a competent authority under Article V(1)(e), P&ID
had no award to enforce and the D.C. district court lacks

Id. at 290.
See Id. at 309 (finding that an express agreement on the procedural law
rebuts any presumption that a different country’s procedural law applies);
see also Belize Soc. Dev., 668 F.3d at 728 (finding that London was competent
authority where the parties expressly agreed to “arbitration under the
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) Rules”); Baker Marine,
191 F.3d at 195 (applying Nigerian arbitration law pursuant to the parties’
express agreement); Dixilyn-Field Drilling, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17992, at
*4 (same).
133 See Karaha Bodas, 364 F.3d at 308-09; RESTATEMENT § 5-12 cmt. b.
131
132
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jurisdiction under the arbitration exception, 28 U.S.C. §
1605(a)(6)(B).
V.

CONCLUSION

The confirmation and subsequent enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards against sovereign states or their
instrumentalities is a delicate issue as it can have political
repercussions. Courts must therefore exercise utmost caution
in exercising jurisdiction over sovereigns. In the United
States, the FSIA provides the sole basis upon which U.S.
courts may assume jurisdiction in a case that involves a
foreign state. As discussed in this Note, some U.S. case law
have interpreted several situations where the arbitration
exception of the FSIA may be applicable. Most importantly,
when the action before a U.S. court involves the confirmation
of an award against a sovereign state, that court must, among
other things, look to see if that award has been set aside by a
court of the seat of the arbitration. If so, then there is no
“existing award” to be confirmed by the court. Consequently,
the court lacks jurisdiction as the foreign state’s immunity has
not been successfully challenged because the arbitration
exception does not apply.
Generally, Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention
gives courts the discretion to go ahead and enforce an award
that has been set aside at the seat of the arbitration. However,
in the United States specifically, this discretion has been
construed to only include situations where the decision
setting aside such award is “tainted,” or where such a
decision “offends fundamental notions of what is decent and
just in the State where enforcement is sought.” Absent these
circumstances, no other grounds exist currently under U.S.
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law for U.S. courts to confirm an award that was vacated at
the seat of arbitration.
In P&ID v. Nigeria, the Nigerian court vacated the
award which was made pursuant to Nigerian law. The
Nigerian court was the competent court to exercise such
power, being the court that had supervisory jurisdiction over
the arbitration. In other words, being the court of the seat of
arbitration, the Nigerian court exercised appropriate
jurisdictional competence to vacate the award rendered by
the tribunal. Because the Nigerian court validly vacated the
award, and there was no allegation that the judgment was
tainted, or that it offends fundamental notions of what is
decent and just in the United States (or any U.S. state where
enforcement is sought), then there was no award for P&ID to
confirm. Thus, the arbitration exception does not apply, and
the D.C. district court cannot not validly exercise jurisdiction
over Nigeria.

